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Abstract
Sensors (e.g., light, gyroscope, accelerometer) and sens-
ing enabled applications on a smart device make the ap-
plications more user-friendly and efficient. However, the
current permission-based sensor management systems of
smart devices only focus on certain sensors and any App
can get access to other sensors by just accessing the
generic sensor API. In this way, attackers can exploit
these sensors in numerous ways: they can extract or leak
users’ sensitive information, transfer malware, or record
or steal sensitive information from other nearby devices.
In this paper, we propose 6thSense, a context-aware in-
trusion detection system which enhances the security of
smart devices by observing changes in sensor data for
different tasks of users and creating a contextual model
to distinguish benign and malicious behavior of sen-
sors. 6thSense utilizes three different Machine Learning-
based detection mechanisms (i.e., Markov Chain, Naive
Bayes, and LMT) to detect malicious behavior associated
with sensors. We implemented 6thSense on a sensor-
rich Android smart device (i.e., smartphone) and col-
lected data from typical daily activities of 50 real users.
Furthermore, we evaluated the performance of 6thSense
against three sensor-based threats: (1) a malicious App
that can be triggered via a sensor (e.g., light), (2) a mali-
cious App that can leak information via a sensor, and (3)
a malicious App that can steal data using sensors. Our
extensive evaluations show that the 6thSense framework
is an effective and practical approach to defeat growing
sensor-based threats with an accuracy above 96% with-
out compromising the normal functionality of the device.
Moreover, our framework costs minimal overhead.
1 Introduction
Smart devices such as smartphones and smartwatches
have become omnipresent in every aspect of human life.
Nowadays, the role of smart devices is not limited to
making phone calls and messaging only. They are in-
tegrated into various applications from home security to
health care to military [18, 60]. Since smart devices
seamlessly integrate the physical world with the cyber
world via their sensors (e.g., light, accelerometer, gyro-
scope, etc.), they provide more efficient and user-friendly
applications [37, 41, 85, 55, 48].
While the number of applications using different sen-
sors [38] is increasing and new devices offer more sen-
sors, the presence of sensors have opened novel ways
to exploit the smart devices [76]. Attackers can exploit
the sensors in many different ways [76]: they can trig-
ger an existing malware on a device with a simple flash-
light [28]; they can use a sensor (e.g., light sensor) to leak
sensitive information; using motion sensors such as ac-
celerometer, and gyroscope, attackers can record or steal
sensitive information from other nearby devices (e.g.,
computers, keyboards) or people [10, 87, 26, 42]. They
can even transfer a specific malware using sensors as a
communication channel [76]. Such sensor-based threats
become more serious with the rapid growth of Apps uti-
lizing many sensors [6, 2].
In fact, these sensor-based threats highlight the flaws
of existing sensor management systems used by smart
devices. Specifically, Android sensor management sys-
tem relies on permission-based access control, which
considers only a few sensors (i.e., microphone, camera,
and GPS)1. Android asks for access permission (i.e., with
a list of permissions) only while an App is being installed
for the first time. Once this permission is granted, the
user has no control over how the listed sensors and other
sensors (not listed) will be used by the specific App.
Moreover, using some sensors is not considered as a vi-
olation of security and privacy in Android. For instance,
any App is permitted to access to motion sensors by just
accessing the sensor API. Access to motion sensors is
not controlled in Android.
1IOS, Windows, and Blackberry also have permission-based sensor
management systems. In this work, we focus on Android.
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Existing studies have proposed enhanced access con-
trol mechanisms for some of the sensors, but these en-
hancements do not cover all the sensors of a smart de-
vice [69]. Some proposed solutions introduced trusted
paths on top of the existing security mechanism for con-
trolling information flow between sensors and Apps, but
these are also App-specific solutions and depend upon
explicit user consent [32, 61]. Thus, introducing ad-
ditional permission controls for sensors of a smart de-
vice will not mitigate the risk of all sensor-based threats
as they are App specific and address only data leakage
risks. Some attacks may not abuse sensors directly, in-
stead, they may use sensors as side channels to acti-
vate another malware [34]. Albeit useful, existing se-
curity schemes overlook these critical threats which di-
rectly impact the security and privacy of the smart device
ecosystem. Moreover, although sensors on smart devices
seem to work independently from each other, a task or
activity on a smart device may activate more than one
sensor to accomplish the task. Hence, it is necessary to
secure all the different sensors [5] on a smart device and
consider the context of the sensors in building any solu-
tion against sensor-based threats.
In order to address the sensor-based threats, in this pa-
per, we present a novel intrusion detection (IDS) frame-
work called 6thSense, a comprehensive security solution
for sensor-based threats for smart devices. The proposed
framework is a context-aware IDS and is built upon the
observation that for any user activity or task (e.g., tex-
ting, making calls, browsing, driving, etc.), a different,
but a specific set of sensors becomes active. In a context-
aware setting, the 6thSense framework is aware of the
sensors activated by each activity or task. 6thSense ob-
serves sensors data in real time and determines the cur-
rent use context of the device according to which it con-
cludes whether the current sensor use is malicious or
not. 6thSense is context-aware and correlates the sen-
sor data for different user activities (e.g., texting, mak-
ing calls, browsing, driving, etc.) on the smart device
and learns how sensors’ data correlates with different ac-
tivities. As a detection mechanism, 6thSense observes
sensors’ data and checks against the learned behavior of
the sensors. In 6thSense, the framework utilizes several
different Machine Learning-based detection mechanisms
to catch sensor-based threats including Markov Chain,
Naive Bayes, and LMT. In this paper, we present the
design of 6thSense on an Android smartphone because
of its large market share [7] and its rich set of sensors.
To evaluate the efficiency of the framework, we tested
it with data collected from real users (50 different users,
nine different typical daily activities [3]). We also evalu-
ated the performance of 6thSense against three different
sensor-based threats and finally analyzed its overhead.
Our evaluation shows that 6thSense can detect sensor-
based attacks with an accuracy and F-Score over 96%.
Also, our evaluation shows a minimal overhead on the
utilization of the system resources.
Contributions: In summary, the main contributions of
this paper are threefold—
• First, the design of 6thSense, a context-aware IDS
to detect sensor-based threats utilizing different ma-
chine learning based models from Markov Chain to
Naive Bayes to LMT.
• Second, the extensive performance evaluation of
6thSense with real user experiments over 50 users.
• Third, testing 6thSense against three different
sensor-based threats.
Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as
follows: we give an overview of sensor-based threats
and existing solutions in Section 2. In section 3, we
briefly discuss the Android’s sensor management system.
Adversary model and design facts and assumptions for
6thSense are briefly discussed in Section 4. Different de-
tection techniques used in our framework are described
in Section 5. In Sections 6 and 7, we provide a detailed
overview of 6thSense including its different components
and discuss its effectiveness by analyzing different per-
formance metrics. Finally, we discuss features and lim-
itations and conclude this paper in Sections 8 and 9, re-
spectively.
2 Related Work
Sensor-based threats [76] on mobile devices have be-
come more prevalent than before with the use of dif-
ferent sensors in smartphones such as user’s location,
keystroke information, etc. Different works [73] have in-
vestigated the possibility of these threats and presented
different potential threats in recent years. One of the
most common threats is keystroke inference in smart-
phones. Smartphones use on-screen QWERTY keyboard
which has specific position for each button. When a user
types in this keyboard, values in smartphone’s motion
sensor (i.e., accelerometer and gyroscope) change ac-
cordingly [16]. As different keystrokes yield different,
but specific values in motion sensors, typing informa-
tion on smartphones can be inferred from an unautho-
rized sensor such as motion sensor data or motion sen-
sor data patterns collected either in the device or from
a nearby device can be used to extract users’ input in
smartphones [9, 66, 52]. The motion sensor data can
be analyzed using different techniques (e.g., machine
learning, frequency domain analysis, shared-memory ac-
cess, etc.) to improve the accuracy of inference tech-
niques such as [12, 53, 81, 46, 58, 47]. Another form of
keystroke inference threat can be performed by observ-
ing only gyroscope data. Smartphones have a feature
of creating vibrations while a user types on the touch-
pad. The gyroscope is sensitive to this vibrational force
and it can be used to distinguish different inputs given
by the users on the touchpad [51, 15, 44]. Recently,
ICS-CERT also issued an alert for accelerometer-based
attacks that can deactivate any device by matching vi-
bration frequency of the accelerometer [2, 1, 70]. Light
sensor readings also change while a user types on the
smartphone; hence, the user input in a smartphone can
be inferred by differentiating the light sensor data in nor-
mal and typing modes [71]. The light sensor can also be
used as a medium to transfer malicious code and trigger
message to activate malware [28, 76]. The audio sen-
sor of a smartphone can be exploited to launch different
malicious attacks (e.g., information leakage, eavesdrop-
ping, etc.) on the device. Attackers can infer keystrokes
by recording tap noises on touchpad [24], record conver-
sation of users [63], transfer malicious code to the device
[73, 76], or even replicate voice commands used in voice-
enabled different Apps like Siri, Google Voice Search,
etc. [21, 39]. Modern smartphone cameras can be used
to covertly capture screenshot or video and to infer infor-
mation about surroundings or user activities [68, 43, 67].
GPS of a smartphone can be exploited to perform a false
data injection attack on smartphones and infer the loca-
tion of a specific device [75, 19].
Solutions for sensor-based threats: Although re-
searchers identified different sensor-based threats in re-
cent years, no complete security mechanism has been
proposed that can secure sensors of a smart device.
Most of the proposed security mechanisms for smart de-
vices are related to anomaly detection at the application
level [78, 74, 80, 22] which are not built with any protec-
tion against sensor-based threats. On the other hand, dif-
ferent methods of intrusion detection have been proposed
for wireless sensor networks (WSN) [72, 30, 86, 23, 59],
but they are not compatible with smart devices. Xu et
al. proposed a privacy-aware sensor management frame-
work for smartphones named Semadroid [82], an exten-
sion to the existing sensor management system where
users could monitor sensor usage of different Apps and
invoke different policies to control sensor access by ac-
tive Apps on a smartphone. Petracca et al. introduced
AuDroid, a SELinux-based policy framework for smart-
phones by performing behavior analysis of microphones
and speakers [57]. AuDroid controls the flow of infor-
mation in the audio channel and notifies users when-
ever an audio channel is requested for access. Jana et
al. proposed DARKLY, a trust management framework
for smartphones which audits applications of different
trust levels with different sensor access permissions [31].
Darkly scans for vulnerability in the source code of an
Figure 1: Android Sensor Management Architecture
application and try to modify the run-time environment
of the device to ensure the privacy of sensor data.
Differences from the existing solutions: Though
there is no direct comparable work to compare 6thSense
with, differences between existing solutions and our
framework can be noted as follows. The main limitation
of Semadroid [82] is that the proposed solution is only
tested against a similar type of attack scenario (informa-
tion leakage by a background application). Semadroid
also does not provide any extensive performance evalua-
tion for the proposed scheme. Finally, this work depends
on user permissions to fully enforce an updated policy
on the sensor usage which is vulnerable as users might
unknowingly approve the sensor permissions for mali-
cious Apps. In another prior work Darkly [31], the pro-
posed framework is not tested against any sensor-based
threats. More recent work Audroid presented a policy
enforced framework to secure only the audio channels
of a smart device. Albeit useful, similar to the others,
this work does not consider other sensor-based threats,
either. Compared to these prior works, 6thSense pro-
vides a comprehensive coverage to all the sensors in a
smart device and ensures security against three different
types of sensor-based threats with high accuracy.
3 Background: Sensor Management in
Smart Devices
Present versions of Android, iOS, or Blackberry do not
comprise of any security mechanism to manage the infor-
mation flow from sensors or among them. For example,
any App can get access to motion sensors by just access-
ing sensor API. One task may need more than one sensor,
but protecting only one sensor is not a viable design. The
lack of ability to secure the information flow between the
sensors and Apps and a holistic view into the utilization
of sensors can lead to different malicious scenarios like
information leakage, eavesdropping, etc.
In our work, we focus on Android because of its open-
source nature. In Figure 1, we present how Android han-
dles access to different sensors by Apps (installed by the
user) and system Apps (installed automatically by An-
droid). Apps access to sensors by sending requests via
Software Development Kit (SDK) API platform which
then registers the App to a corresponding sensor [45]. If
more than one App tries to access the same sensor, the
SDK API runs a multiplexing process which enables dif-
ferent Apps to be registered in the same sensor. Hard-
ware Abstraction Layer (HAL) works as an interface to
bind the sensor hardware with the device drivers in An-
droid. HAL has two parts: Sensors.h works as HAL in-
terface and Sensors.cpp works as the HAL implementa-
tion. Through the HAL library, different applications can
communicate with the underlying Linux kernel to read
and write files associated with sensors. For most of the
sensors, no permission is needed to access these files. For
permission-imposed sensors (i.e., camera, microphone,
and GPS), a permission is explicitly needed from the user
to ensure file access to a specific App. This user permis-
sion is declared inside the AndroidManifest.xml file of an
App and once the user accepts the permission, that App
can have access to the corresponding sensor and other
no-permission imposed sensors even without any explicit
approval from the users. This lack of security in sensor
access can lead to different malicious attacks on a device.
4 Adversary Model and Assumptions
In this section, we discuss different threats that may use
sensors to execute malicious activities on a smart device.
Different design assumptions are also explained in this
section.
4.1 Adversary Model
For this work, we consider the following sensor-based
threats similar to [76]:
• Threat 1-Triggering a malicious App via a sen-
sor. A malicious App can exist in the smart device
which can be triggered by sending a specific sen-
sory pattern or message via sensors.
• Threat 2-Information leakage via a sensor. A ma-
licious App can exist in the device which can leak
information to any third party using sensors.
• Threat 3-Stealing information via a sensor. A ma-
licious App can exist in the device which can exploit
the sensors of a smart device and start stealing infor-
mation after inferring a specific device mode (e.g.,
sleeping).
In this paper, we cover these three types of malicious
sensor-based threats. We also note that to build our ad-
versary model, we consider any component on a smart
device that interacts with the physical world as a sen-
sor [57]. In section 7, we show how 6thSense defends
against these threats.
4.2 Design Assumptions and Features
In designing a comprehensive security scheme like
6thSense for sensor-based threats, we note the following
design assumptions and features:
• Sensor co-dependence: A sensor in a smart device
is normally considered as an independent entity on
the device. Thus, one sensor does not know what is
happening in another sensor. However, in this work,
we consider sensors as co-dependent entities on a
device instead of independent entities. The reason
for this stems from the fact that for each user activity
or task on a smart device, a specific set of sensors re-
mains active. For example, if a user is walking with
a phone in hand, motion sensors (i.e., gyroscope,
accelerometer), the light sensor, GPS will be ac-
tive. On the contrary, if the user is walking with the
phone in the pocket or bag, instead of the light sen-
sor, the proximity sensor will remain active. Thus,
a co-dependent relationship exists between sensors
while performing a specific task. Each activity uses
different, but specific set of sensors to perform the
task efficiently. Hence, one can distinguish the user
activity by observing the context of the sensors for
a specific task. 6thSense uses the context of all the
sensors to distinguish between normal user activi-
ties and malicious activities. In summary, sensors
in a smart device are individually independent, but
per activity-wise dependent and 6thSense considers
the context of the activities in its design.
• Adaptive sensor sampling: Different sensors have
different sampling frequencies. To monitor all the
sensor data for a specific time, a developed solu-
tion must consider and sample the sensor data cor-
rectly. Our proposed framework considers sampling
the sensor data over a certain time period instead of
individual sensor frequencies which mitigates any
possible error in processing of data from different
sensors.
• Faster computation: Modern high precision sen-
sors on smart devices have high resolution and sam-
pling rate. As a result, sensors provide large volume
of data even for a small time interval. A solution
for sensor-based threats should quickly process any
large data from different sensors in real time while
ensuring a high detection rate. To address this, we
use different machine learning algorithms which are
proven simple and fast techniques [11, 62].
• Real-time monitoring: 6thSense provides real-time
monitoring to all the sensors which mitigates the
possibility of data tempering or false data injection
on the device.
5 Detection Techniques: Theoretical Foun-
dation
In this section, we describe the details of the detection
techniques used in 6thSense from a theoretical perspec-
tive.
For the context-aware IDS in 6thSense, we utilize sev-
eral different machine learning-based techniques includ-
ing Markov Chain [13], Naive Bayes [50] and alterna-
tive set of ML algorithms (e.g., PART, Logistic Function,
J48, LMT, Hoeffding Tree, and Multilayer Perception)
to differentiate between normal behavior from malicious
behavior on a smart device. The main advantage of us-
ing Markov Chain model is that it is easy to build the
model from a large dataset and computational require-
ments are modest which can be met by resource-limited
devices. As smart devices have less processing speed,
a Markov Chain-based approach can work smoothly in
the context of sensor data analysis. On the other hand,
Naive Bayes technique is chosen for its fast computa-
tion rate, small training dataset requirement, and ability
to modify it with new training data without rebuilding
the model from scratch. Other ML techniques are also
common in malware detection because of higher accu-
racy rate. A brief discussion of these approaches in the
context of 6thSense is given below. The efficacy of these
different approaches utilized in 6thSense is analyzed in
Section 7.
5.1 Markov Chain-Based Detection
A Markov Chain-based detection model can be described
as a discrete-time stochastic process which denotes a
set of random variables and defines how these variables
change over time. Markov Chain can be applied to illus-
trate a series of events where and what state will occur
next depends only on the previous state. In 6thSense, a
series of events represents user activity and state repre-
sents sensor conditions (i.e., sensor values, on/off status)
of the sensors in a smart device. We can represent the
probabilistic condition of Markov Chain as in Equation
1 where Xt denotes the state at time t [35]:
P(Xt+1 = x|X1 = x1,X2 = x2...,Xt = xt) =
P(Xt+1 = x|Xt = Xt),
when, P(X1 = x1,X2 = x2...,Xt = xt)> 0
(1)
In 6thSense, we observe the changes of the conditions
of a set of sensors as a variable which changes over time.
The condition of a sensor indicates whether the sensor
value is changing or not from a previous sensor value in
time. As such, S denotes a set which represents current
conditions of n number of sensors. So, S can be repre-
sented as follows.
S = {S1,S2,S3, ...,Sn},
S1,S2,S3, ...,Sn = 0 or 1
(2)
For 6thSense, we use a modified version of the general
Markov Chain. Here, instead of predicting the next state,
6thSense determines the probability of a transition oc-
curring between two states at a given time. In 6thSense,
the Markov Chain model is trained with a training dataset
collected from real users and the transition matrix is built
accordingly. Then, 6thSense determines conditions of
sensors for time t and t+1. Let us assume, a and b are
a sensor’s state in time t and t+1. 6thSense looks up for
the probability of transition from state a to b which can
be found by looking up in the transition matrix, P and
calculating P(a,b). As the training dataset consists sen-
sor data from benign activities, we can assume that, if
transition from state a to b is malicious, the calculated
probability from transition matrix will be zero. Details
of this Markov Chain-based detection model in 6thSense
are given in Appendix A1.
5.2 Naive Bayes Based Detection
Naive Bayes model is a simple probability estimation
method which is based on Bayes’ method. The main as-
sumption of the Naive Bayes detection is that the pres-
ence of a particular sensor condition in a task/activity
has no influence over the presence of any other feature
on that particular event. The probability of each event
can be calculated by observing the presence of a set of
specific features.
6thSense considers users’ activity as a combination of
n number of sensors. Assume X is a set which repre-
sents current conditions of n number of sensors. We con-
sider that conditions of sensors are conditionally inde-
pendent (See Section 4.2), which means a change in one
sensor’s working condition (i.e., on/off states) has no ef-
fect over a change in another sensor’s working condition.
As explained earlier, the probability of executing a task
depends on the conditions of a specific set of sensors.
So, in summary, although one sensors’ condition does
not control another sensor’s condition, overall the proba-
bility of executing a specific task depends on all the sen-
sors’ conditions. As an example, if a person is walking
with his smartphone in his hand, the motion sensors (ac-
celerometer and gyroscope) will change. However, this
change will not force the light sensor or the proximity
sensor to change its condition. Thus, sensors in a smart-
phone change their conditions independently, but execute
a task together. We can have a generalized model for this
context-aware detection [49] as follows:
p(X |c) =
n
∏
i=1
p(Xi|c) (3)
Detailed description of this Naive Bayes model in
6thSense is given in Appendix A2.
5.3 Alternative Detection Techniques
In addition to Markov Chain and Naive Bayes mod-
els above, there are other machine learning algorithms
(such as PART, Logistic Function, J48, LMT, Hoeffding
Tree, and Multilayer Perception) that are very popular
for anomaly detection frameworks because of their faster
computation ability and easy implementation feature. In
the alternative detection techniques, we used four types
of ML-based classifier to build an analytical model for
6thSense. The following briefly discusses these classi-
fiers and our rationale to include them.
Rule-based Learning. Rule-based ML works by iden-
tifying a set of relational rules between attributes of a
given dataset and represents the model observed by the
system [25]. The main advantage of the rule-based learn-
ing is that it identifies a single model which can be ap-
plied commonly to any instances of the dataset to make a
prediction of outcome. As we train 6thSense with differ-
ent user activities, the rule-based learning provides one
model to predict data for all the user activities which sim-
plifies the framework. For 6thSense, we chose, PART al-
gorithm for the rule-based learning.
Regression Model. Regression model is widely used in
data mining for its faster computation ability. This type
of classifier observes the relations between dependent
and independent variables to build a prediction model
[20, 79]. For 6thSense, we have a total 11 attributes
where we have one dependent variable (device state:
malicious/benign) and ten independent variables (sensor
conditions). Regression model observes the change in
the dependent variable by changing the values of the in-
dependent variables and build the prediction model. We
use the logistic regression model in 6thSense, which per-
Figure 2: Overview of 6thSense.
forms with high accuracy against conventional Android
malware [65].
Neural Network. Neural network is another common
technique that is being adapted by researchers for mal-
ware detection. In neural network techniques, the rela-
tion between attributes of dataset is compared with the
biological neurons and a relation map is created to ob-
serve the changes for each attribute [40]. We chose Mul-
tilayer Perceptron algorithm for training the 6thSense
framework as it can distinguish relationships among non-
linear dataset.
Decision Tree. Decision tree algorithms are predictive
models where decision maps are created by observing
the changes in one attribute in different instances [84].
These types of algorithms are mostly used in a prediction
model where output can have a finite set of values. For
6thSense, we utilized and tested three different decision
tree algorithms (J48, LMT (Logistic Model Tree), and
Hoeffding tree) to compare the outcome of our frame-
work.
6 6thSense Framework
In this section, we provide a detailed overview of our
proposed contextual behavior IDS framework, 6thSense,
for detecting sensor-based threats on smart devices. As
illustrated in Figure 2, 6thSense has three main phases:
(1) data collection, (2) data processing, and (3) data anal-
ysis. In the data collection phase, we use a custom An-
droid application to collect the sensor data for differ-
ent user activities and the collected sensor data are then
processed in the data processing phase. Note that in
6thSense some sensors provide discrete values as data
(e.g., accelerometer, gyroscope, light sensor, etc.) while
other sensors provide their on-off state as sensor data
(e.g., microphone, speaker, etc.). In phase 3, the col-
lected data is fed into detection models and the end result
indicates whether the current state of the device is mali-
cious or not. The following sub-sections briefly describe
these three phases.
6.1 Data Collection Phase
In this phase, 6thSense collects data from different sen-
sors of a smart device. There can be multiple sensors in
a smart device. We chose nine sensors in total to identify
different user activities using a sensor-rich Android de-
vice. The sensors selected are accelerometer, gyroscope,
light sensor, proximity sensor, GPS, audio sensor (micro-
phone and speaker), camera, and headphone. 6thSense
does not consider all the other sensors available in the
device because all typical user activities do not affect all
the sensor values. For example, the gravity sensor value
does not change effectively while talking or walking with
the phone. The chosen sensors are then categorized into
two following categories.
• No-permission-imposed sensors: No-permission-
imposed sensors can be defined as sensors that do
not need any user permission explicitly to be ac-
cessed by an App. For 6thSense, we chose four
no-permission imposed sensors (i.e., accelerome-
ter, gyroscope, light, proximity sensors). We can
also refer these sensors as data-oriented sensors in
the context of 6thSense because values provided by
these sensors need to be observed to infer user activ-
ities. For example, accelerometer’s and gyroscope’s
values change with motion and they give values on
X, Y, and Z axes. These values change along with
the motion in different axes. To detect whether a
sensor is activated or not for a specific activity, one
needs to observe values of these sensors.
• Permission-imposed sensors: Permission-imposed
sensors are those which need user permission to be
accessed by an App. For 6thSense, we chose five
permission-imposed sensors to build the context-
aware model (camera, microphone, GPS, speaker,
and headset). The conditions of these sensors can
be represented by their logical states (on/off status)
for different user activities. Hence, we also referred
to these sensors as logic-oriented sensors in the con-
text of 6thSense. For example, camera has only two
values to identify users’ activity: on and off. So, it
can be represented with 0 or 1 to detect if the cam-
era is on or off correspondingly.
To collect the data and logical values from sensors,
we built a custom Android App and 6thSense used this
in the data collection phase. In Android, this App uses
sensoreventlistener API to log numerical values of the
data-oriented sensors. On the other hand, the App deter-
mines the state of the sensor and logs 0 or 1 if the sensor
is on or off, respectively. This App uses the user permis-
sion access to use the microphone, GPS, and camera to
record the working condition of these sensors. For GPS,
we consider two datasets - either GPS is turned on or
not and either location is changing or not. In total, six
different logic state information for five aforementioned
permission-imposed sensors are collected by this App.
Note that we chose different typical daily human activ-
ities [4] that involve the smart device to build our contex-
tual model. These activities include walking (with phone
in hand and pocket), talking, interacting (playing games,
browsing, listening to music), video calling, driving (as
driver and passenger). Furthermore, the number of ac-
tivities is configurable in 6thSense and is not limited to
aforementioned examples. In the evaluation of 6thSense,
we chose a total of nine typical daily activities as they
are considered as common user activities for a smart de-
vice [4]. We collect these data using the App for different
users to train the 6thSense framework which is then used
to distinguish the normal sensor behavior from the ma-
licious behavior. In summary, the aforementioned App
collects data from nine different sensors for nine typi-
cal user activities. We observe sensor state (combina-
tion of working conditions (i.e., values, on/off status) of
nine different sensors) in a per second manner for each
user activity. Each second of data for user activity cor-
responds to 1024 state information from nine different
sensors.
6.2 Data Processing Phase
After the data collection, in the second phase of the
framework, we organize the data to use in the proposed
IDS framework. As different sensors have different fre-
quencies on the smart device, the total number of read-
ings of sensors for a specific time period is different. For
example, the accelerometer and gyroscope of Samsung
Galaxy S5 have a sampling frequency of approximately
202 Hz while the light sensor has a sampling frequency
of 5.62 Hz. Thus, the data collected in Phase 1 needs
to be sampled and reorganized. 6thSense observes the
change in the sensor condition in each second to deter-
mine the overall state of our device and from this per
second change, 6thSense determines the activity of users.
For this reason, 6thSense takes all the data given by a sin-
gle sensor in a second and calculates the average value
of the sensor reading. This process is only applicable for
the data oriented sensors as mentioned earlier. Again, the
data collected from the App is numerical value given by
the sensor. However, for the detection model, we only
Sensor
type Name Model Specification
No-permission imposed
sensors
Accelerometer MPU6500 Acceleration Sensor 19.6133 m/s2, 203.60 Hz, 0.25 mA
Gyroscope MPU6500 Gyroscope Sensor 8.726646 rad/s, 203.60 Hz, 6.1 mA
Light Sensor TMG399X RGB Sensor 600000 lux, 5.62 Hz, 0.75 mA
Proximity Sensor TMG399X proximity sensor 8V, 0.75 mA
Permission-imposed sensors
Camera Samsung S5K2P2XX 12 megapixels, 30 fps, 4.7 mA
Microphone
Qualcomm Snapdragon
801 Processor built in microphone
86 dB, .75 mA
Speaker
Qualcomm Snapdragon
801 Processor built in speaker
110 dB, 1 mA
Table 1: Sensor list of Samsung Galaxy S5 Duo used in experiment.
consider the condition of the sensors. 6thSense observes
the data collected by the aforementioned App and deter-
mines whether the condition of sensors is changing or
not. If the sensor value is changing from the previous
value in time, 6thSense represents the sensor condition
as 1 and 0 otherwise. The logic state information col-
lected from the sensors need to be reorganized, too as
these data are merged with the data collected from the
collected values from the other sensors to create an in-
put matrix. The sampling frequency of the logical state
detection is 0.2 Hz which means in every five seconds
the App generates one session of dataset. We consider
the condition of the sensors to be the same over this time
period and organize the data accordingly. The reorga-
nized data generated from the aforementioned App are
then merged to create the training matrices.
6.3 Data Analysis Phase
In the third and final phase, 6thSense uses different ma-
chine learning-based detection techniques introduced in
the previous section to analyze the data matrices gener-
ated in the previous phase.
For the Markov Chain-based detection, we use 75% of
the collected data to train 6thSense and generate the tran-
sition matrix. This transition matrix is used to determine
whether the transition from one state to another is appro-
priate or not. Here, state refers to generic representation
of all the sensors’ conditions on a device. For testing pur-
poses we have two different data set — basic activities or
trusted model and malicious activities or threat model.
The trusted model consists of 25% of the collected data
for different user activities. We test the trusted model
to ensure the accuracy of the 6thSense framework in de-
tecting benign activities. The threat model is built from
performing the attack scenarios mentioned in Section 4.
We calculate the probability of a transition occurring be-
tween two states at a given time and accumulate the total
probability to distinguish between normal and malicious
activities.
To implement the Naive Bayes-based detection tech-
nique, we use the training sessions to define different
user activities. In 6thSense, we have nine typical user
activities in total as listed in Table 2. We use groundtruth
user data to define these activities. Using the theoretical
foundation explained in Section 5, we calculate the prob-
ability of a test session to belong to any of these defined
activities. As we consider one second of data in each
computational cycle, we calculate the total probability
up to a predefined configurable time interval (in this case
five minutes). This calculated probability is used to de-
tect malicious activities from normal activities. If the
computed probability for all the known benign activities
is not over a predefined threshold, then it is detected as a
malicious activity.
For the other alternative machine-learning-based de-
tection techniques, we used WEKA, a data mining tool
which offers data analysis using different machine learn-
ing approaches [64, 27]. Basically, WEKA is a collection
of machine learning algorithms developed at the Univer-
sity of Waikato, New Zealand, which can be directly ap-
plied to a dataset or can be integrated with a framework
using JAVA platform [56]. WEKA offers different types
of classifier to analyze and build predictive model from
given dataset. We use 10 fold cross-validation method to
train and test 6thSense with different ML techniques in
Section 7.
7 Performance Evaluation of 6thSense
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of the proposed
context-aware IDS framework, 6thSense, in detecting the
sensor-based threats on a smart device. We test 6thSense
with the data collected from different users for benign
activities and adversary model described in Section 4.
As discussed earlier, 6thSense considers three sensor-
based threats: (1) a malicious App that can be triggered
via a light or motion sensors, (2) a malicious App that
can leak information via audio sensor, and (3) a mali-
cious App that steals data via camera. Furthermore, we
measured the performance impact of 6thSense on the de-
vice and present a detailed results for the efficiency of
the 6thSense framework. Finally, we discuss the perfor-
mance overhead of the framework in this section.
7.1 Training Environment
In order to test the effectiveness of 6thSense, we imple-
mented it on a sensor-rich Android-based smartphone.
However, our framework would also efficiently work in
another smart device such as smartwatch. In the eval-
uations, we used Samsung Galaxy S5 Duos as a refer-
ence Android device to collect sensor data for different
typical user activities. We chose this Android device as
Samsung currently holds approximately 20.7% of total
marketshare of smartphone [8] and provides a rich set of
sensors. A list of sensors of Samsung Galaxy S5 Duos is
given in Table 1. As discussed earlier, we selected 9 dif-
ferent typical user activities or tasks to collect user data.
These are typical basic activities with smartphones that
people usually do in their daily lives [3]. The user ac-
tivities/tasks are categorized in two categories as generic
activities and user related activities.
Generic activities are the activities in which the sensor
readings are not affected by the smartphone users. Sleep-
ing, driving with the phone using GPS as a navigator, and
driving with phone in pocket are three generic activities
that we considered in this work. Basically, in the generic
activities, sensors’ data are not affected by different users
since the smart phone is not in contact with the user or
user is not directly interacting with the phone. For user-
related activities, in which the sensor readings may be
affected by the device user, we identified six different ac-
tivities including walking with the phone in hand, play-
ing games, browsing, and making voice calls and video
calls.
6thSense was tested by 50 different individuals aged
from 18 to 45 while the sensor data was collected. We
note that our study with human subjects was approved
by the appropriate Institutional Review Board (IRB) and
we followed all the procedures strictly in our study. Each
participant received some monetary compensation for
participating in our experiments. To ensure privacy and
anonymity, we used fake user IDs rather than any per-
sonal information. We collected 300 sets of data for six
user-related activities where each dataset comprised of 5
minutes long data from the selected nine sensors men-
tioned in Section 6. We also collected three sets of data
for each general activity. We asked the different users to
perform the same activity to ensure the integrity for dif-
ferent tasks. Note that each five minute of data collected
for user related and generic activities corresponds to 300
events with 1024 different states. Here, states represent a
combination of conditions (i.e., values, on/off status) of
nine different sensors and events represent user activities
per second. So, a total of 307,200 different event-state
information were analyzed by 6thSense.
For the malicious dataset, we created three different
attack scenarios considering the adversary model men-
tioned in Section 4. For Threat 1, we developed two dif-
ferent Android Apps which could be triggered using the
light sensor and motion sensors on the smartphone. To
perform the attack described in Threat 2, we developed
a malware that could record conversations as audio clips
and playback after a specific time to leak the informa-
tion. This attack scenario included both the microphone
and speaker on the smartphone. For Threat 3, we devel-
oped a malicious App that could scan all the sensors and
if none of the sensors were changing their working con-
Task Category Task Name
Generic Activities
1. Sleeping
2. Driving as driver
3. Driving as passenger
User-related Activities
1. Walking with phone in
hand
2. Walking with phone in
pocket/bag
3. Playing games
4. Browsing
5. Making phone calls
6. Making video calls
Table 2: Typical Activities of Users on Smart Device [3].
ditions, the malicious App could open up the camera and
record videos surreptitiously. We collected 15 different
datasets from these three attack scenarios to test the effi-
cacy of 6thSense against these adversaries.
7.2 Dataset
In order to test 6thSense, we divided the collected real
user data into two sections as it is a common practice
[77]. 75% of the collected benign dataset was used to
train the 6thSense framework and 25% of the collected
data along with malicious dataset were used for test-
ing purposes. For the Markov Chain-based detection
technique, the training dataset was used to compute the
state transitions and to build the transition matrix. On
the other hand, in the Naive Bayes-based detection tech-
nique, the training dataset was used to determine the fre-
quency of sensor condition changes for a particular ac-
tivity or task. As noted earlier, there were nine activities
for the Naive Bayes technique. We split the data accord-
ing to their activity for this approach. For the analysis of
the other ML-based approaches, we define all the data in
benign and malicious classes. The data were then used
to train and test 6thSense using 10-fold cross validation
for different ML algorithms.
Threshold
(Number of consecutive
malicious states )
Recall
rate
False negative
rate
Precision rate
(specificity)
False positive
rate Accuracy F-score
0 0.62 0.38 1 0 0.6833 0.7654
1 0.86 0.14 1 0 0.8833 0.9247
2 0.96 0.04 1 0 0.9667 0.9796
3 0.98 0.02 1 0 0.9833 0.9899
5 1 0 0.9 0.1 0.9833 0.9474
6 1 0 0.8 0.2 0.9667 0.8889
8 1 0 0.6 0.4 0.9333 0.75
10 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.9167 0.6667
12 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.9167 0.6667
15 1 0 0.3 0.7 0.8833 0.4615
Table 3: Performance evaluation of Markov Chain based model.
7.3 Performance Metrics
In the evaluation of 6thSense, we utilized the following
six different performance metrics: Recall rate (sensitiv-
ity or True Positive rate), False Negative rate, Specificity
(True Negative rate), False Positive rate, Accuracy, and
F-score. True Positive (TP) indicates number of benign
activities that are detected correctly while true negative
(TN) refers to the number of correctly detected malicious
activities. On the other hand, False Positive (FP) states
malicious activities that are detected as benign activities
and False Negative (FN) defines number of benign activ-
ities that are categorized as malicious activity. F-score is
the performance metric of a framework that reflects the
accuracy of the framework by considering the recall rate
and specificity. These performance metrics are defined
as follows:
Recall rate =
T P
T P+FN
, (4)
False negative rate =
FN
T P+FN
, (5)
Speci f icity =
T N
T N+FP
, (6)
False positive rate =
FP
T N+FP
, (7)
Recall rate =
T P
T P+FN
, (8)
Accuracy =
T P+T N
T P+T N+FP+FN
, (9)
F− score = 2∗Recall rate∗Precision rate
Recall rate+Precision rate
(10)
In addition to the aforementioned performance metrics,
we considered Receiver Operating Characterstic (ROC)
curve as another performance metric for 6thSense.
7.4 Evaluation of Markov Chain-Based
Detection
In the Markov Chain-based detection technique, we
question whether the transition between two states (sen-
sors’ on/off condition in each second) is expected or not.
In the evaluations, we used 65 testing sessions in total,
among which 50 sessions were for the benign activities
and the rest of the sessions were for the malicious ac-
tivities. A session is composed of a series of sensory
context conditions where a sensory context condition is
the set of all available sensor conditions (on/off state) for
different sensors. As discussed earlier in Section 6, a
sensor condition is a value indicating whether the sen-
sor data is changing or not. In this evaluation, the sen-
sory context conditions were computed every one sec-
ond. We observed that in real devices sometimes some
sensor readings would be missed or real data would not
be reflected probably due to hardware or software im-
perfections. And, real malicious Apps would cause con-
secutive malicious states on the device. Therefore, to
overcome this, we also keep track of number of consecu-
tive malicious states and use it as a threshold after which
the session is considered as malicious. Table 3 displays
the evaluation results associated wit the Markov Chain-
based detection technique. When the threshold for con-
secutive malicious states is 0, i.e., when no threshold is
applied, the accuracy is just 68% and FNR is as high as
38%. With increasing the threshold value, the accuracy
first increases up to 98% then start decreasing.
The possible cut-off threshold can be three consecu-
tive malicious occurrences which has both accuracy and
F-score over 98%. In Table 3, different performance in-
dicators for Markov Chain based detection are presented.
We can observe that FN and TN rates of Markov Chain-
based detection decrease as the threshold of consecutive
malicious states increases. Again, both accuracy and F-
Threshold
Probability
Recall
rate
False negative
rate
Precision rate
(specificity)
False positive
rate Accuracy F-score
55% 1 0 0.6 0.4 0.9333 0.75
57% 1 0 0.7 0.3 0.95 0.8235
60% 1 0 0.7 0.3 0.95 0.8235
62% 1 0 0.7 0.3 0.95 0.8235
65% 0.94 0.06 0.7 0.3 0.9 0.8024
67% 0.88 0.12 0.7 0.3 0.85 0.7797
70% 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.7167 0.7467
72% 0.7 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.7333 0.7875
75% 0.66 0.34 0.9 0.1 0.7 0.7616
80% 0.66 0.34 0.9 0.1 0.7 0.7615
Table 4: Performance evaluation of Naive Bayes model.
score reach to a peak value with the threshold of three
consecutive malicious states on the device. From Fig-
ure 3, we can see that FP rate remains zero while TP rate
increases at the beginning. The highest TP rate without
introducing any FP case is over 98%. After 98%, it intro-
duces some FP cases in the system which is considered as
a risk to the system. In summary, Markov Chain-base de-
tection in 6thSense can acquire accuracy over 98% with-
out introducing any FP cases.
Figure 3: ROC curve of Markov Chain-based detection.
7.5 Evaluation of Naive Bayes-based De-
tection
In the Naive Bayes-based detection technique, 6thSense
calculates the probability of a session to match it with
each activity defined in Section7.1. Since all the activ-
ities are benign and there is no malicious activity (i.e.,
ground-truth data), 6thSense checks calculated probabil-
ity of an activity from dataset against a threshold to de-
termine the correct activity. If there is no match for a cer-
tain sensor condition with any of the activities, 6thSense
detects the session as malicious. Table 4 shows the eval-
uation results.
For a threshold value of 55%, FN rate is zero. How-
ever, FPR is too high, which lowers F-score of the frame-
work. For a threshold of 60%, FPR decreases while FNR
is still zero. In this case, accuracy is 95% and F-score is
82%. If the threshold is increased over 65%, it reduces
the recall rate which affects accuracy and F-score. The
evaluation indicates that the threshold value of 60% pro-
vides an accuracy of 95% and F-score of 82%.
From Figure 4, one can observe the relation between
FPR and TPR of Naive Bayes-based detection. For FPR
larger than 0.3, TPR becomes 1.
Figure 4: ROC curve of Naive Bayes-based detection.
7.6 Evaluation of Alternative Detection
Techniques
In alternative detection techniques, we used other super-
vised machine learning techniques to train the 6thSense
framework. For this, we utilized WEKA and it provides
three types of analysis - split percentage analysis, cross-
validation analysis, and supplied test set analysis. We
chose 10 fold cross-validation analysis to ensure that all
the data was used for both training and test. Thus, the
error rate of the predictive model would be minimized
Algorithms Recallrate
False negative
rate Precision rate
False positive
rate Accuracy F-score
PART 0.9998 0.0002 0.6528 0.3472 0.99 0.7899
Logistic Function 0.9997 0.0003 0.2778 0.7222 0.998 0.4348
J48 0.9998 0.0002 0.6528 0.3472 0.99 0.7899
LMT 0.9998 0.0002 0.9306 0.0694 0.9997 0.964
Hoeffding Tree 1 0 0.0556 0.9444 0.9978 0.1053
Multilayer Perceptron 0.9998 0.0002 0.6944 0.3056 0.9991 0.8196
Table 5: Performance of other different machine learning based-detection techniques tested in 6thSense.
in the cross validation. In Table 5, a detailed evalua-
tion of different machine learning algorithms is given for
6thSense. For Rule Based Learning, 6thSense has the
best result for PART algorithm, which has an accuracy
of 0.99 and F-score of 0.7899. On the other hand, for
Regression Analysis, we use the logistic function which
has high FPR (0.7222) and lower F-score (0.4348). Mul-
tilayer Perceptron algorithm gives an accuracy of 0.9991
and F-score of 0.8196, which is higher than previously
mentioned algorithms. However, FPR is much higher
(0.3056), which is actually a limitation for intrusion de-
tection frameworks in general. Compared to these algo-
rithms, Linear Model Tree (LMT) gives better results in
detecting sensor-based attacks. This evaluation indicates
that LMT provides an accuracy of 0.9997 and F-score of
0.964.
7.7 Comparison
In this subsection, we give a comparison among the
different machine-learning-based detection approaches
tested in 6thSense for defending against sensor-based
threats. For all the approaches, we select the best pos-
sible case and report their performance metrics in Ta-
ble 6. For Markov Chain-based detection, we choose
three consecutive malicious states as valid device con-
ditions. On the other hand, in Naive Bayes approach, the
best performance is observed for the threshold of 60%.
For other machine learning algorithms tested via WEKA,
we choose LMT as it gives highest accuracy among other
machine learning algorithms. These results indicate that
LMT provides highest accuracy and F-score compared to
the other two approaches.
On the contrary, Naive Bayes model displays higher
recall rate and less FNR than other approaches. However,
the presence of FPR in IDS is a serious security threat to
the system since FPR refers to a malicious attack that is
identified as a valid state, which is a threat to user pri-
vacy and security of the device. Both Markov Chain and
LMT has lower FPR. In summary, considering F-score
and accuracy of all these approaches, we conclude that
LMT performs better than the others.
Performance
Metrics
Markov
Chain
Naive
Bayes LMT
Recall rate 0.98 1 0.9998
False Negative Rate 0.02 0 0.0002
Precision rate 1 0.7 0.9306
False positive rate 0 0.3 0.0694
Accuracy 0.9833 0.9492 0.9997
F-Score 0.9899 0.8235 0.964
auPRC 0.947 0.686 0.91
Table 6: Comparison of different machine-learning-
based approaches proposed for 6thSense (i.e., Markov
Chain, Naive Bayes, and LMT).
7.8 Performance Overhead
As previously mentioned, 6thSense collects data in an
Android device from different sensors (permission and
no-permission imposed sensors). In this sub-section,
we measure the performance overhead introduced by
6thSense on the tested Android device in terms of CPU
usage, RAM usage, file size, and power consumption and
Table 7 gives the details of the performance overhead.
For no-permission-imposed sensors, the data collec-
tion phase logs all the values within a time interval
which causes an increased usage of RAM, CPU and
Disc compared to permission- imposed or logic-oriented
sensors. For the power consumption, we observe that
no-permission-imposed sensors use higher power than
permission-imposed sensors. This is mainly because
logic-oriented sensors have lower sampling rate, which
reduces its resource needs.
The overall performance overhead is as low as 4% of
CPU, less then 40MB RAM space, and less than 15MB
disc space. Thus, its overhead is minimal and accept-
able for an IDS system on current smartphones. One of
the main concerns of implementing 6thSense on Android
device is the power consumption.
Table 7 also shows the power consumption of the
Android app used in 6thsense. For one minute,
6thsense consumes 16.62 mW power which increases
upto 178.33mW for ten seconds. The main reason of
this high power consumption is that all the sensors are
kept on for the data collection and all the data are saved
on device for later analysis. However, in practical set-
tings, the data would not be saved on device rather a real
time analysis would be done, which indeed will decrease
the power consumption. Without saving the data, the
power consumption significantly becomes smaller. From
Table 7, we can observe that the power consumption of
6thSense becomes 72.35 mW which is almost 2.5 times
lower than otherwise. Also, all the sensors do not have
to remain on for the analysis part. Data can be observed
if the smart device is in unlocked status. Also, a suitable
interval can be chosen for the data analysis by estimat-
ing average time of an attack. This is one of the possible
future research directions for 6thSense.
Parameters Time
No-permission
imposed
sensors
Permission
imposed
sensors
CPU Usage N/A 3.90% 0.3%
RAM Usage N/A 23 MB 14 MB
Disc Usage
For 1 min 6.5 MB 1 KB
For 5 min 9 MB 2 KB
For 10
min
12 MB 3 KB
Power
Consumption
1 min 13.5 mW 3.12 mW
5 min 96.67 mW 27.4 mW
10 min 133.33 mW 45 mW
Power
Consumption
(without datafile)
1 min 2.68 mW 0.23 mW
5 min 23.4 mW 9.63 mW
10 min 55.35 mW 17 mW
Table 7: Performance Overhead of Android Apps.
8 Discussion and Limitations
• Features and Benefits- Compared to the existing
solutions, 6thSense differentiates itself by consid-
ering a context-aware model to detect sensor-based
threats. As sensors provide continuous data to the
apps, security schemes must handle real-time data
rather than stored data in the system. While most of
the existing solutions work with the stored data or
the data used by Apps [14, 29], 6thSense offers real-
time sensor monitoring. On the other hand, mod-
ern high precision sensors on-board have higher fre-
quency and sensitivity. These sensors can detect
slight changes in the smart device’s ambiance which
reflects on sensor values. To overcome frequent
changes in sensor values, 6thSense considers av-
erage values over one second, which mitigates the
effect of changes in sensor values caused by the
device ambiance. For example, if a person walks
by a smartphone, the light sensor and motion sen-
sors values will be changed for that instance. How-
ever, if one considers the average value over one
second, it will be compensated by other readings
recorded over one second. Another unique fea-
ture of 6thSense is that instead of considering the
individual sensor data accessed by the Apps, user
activities are monitored, which forms the basis of
the contextual model for the 6thSense framework.
6thSense observes changes in sensors for different
user activities. As more than one sensor remain ac-
tive to perform a task, attackers need to learn the
pattern of all the sensors for user activities to out-
perform 6thSense. If an attacker targets one spe-
cific sensor, an attack scenario will differ from nor-
mal user activity which can be easily detected by
6thSense. Thus, the context of user activities is very
important to detect malicious activities in 6thSense.
Moreover, 6thSense considers all the sensors’ con-
ditions as one device state, which provides easy
monitoring of the sensors by one framework. Fi-
nally, 6thSense can work with all the sensors on a
smart device extending the security beyond the tra-
ditional permission-imposed sensors (i.e., GPS, mi-
crophone, and camera).
• Application Level Detection- One of the promis-
ing practical applications of 6thSense is to com-
bine the sensor level detection with an application
level intrusion detection. 6thSense focuses on de-
tecting malicious activities by observing working
conditions of sensors rather than individual App be-
haviors. However, some prior works [82, 57, 78]
also show that it is possible to achieve good accu-
racy when detecting malicious activities by observ-
ing sensor usage in the application level. The com-
bination of application and sensor level detection
might be one promising way to further improve the
performance of 6thSense. Another interesting ap-
plication of 6thSense would be to combine it with
an online training method to eliminate the necessity
of offline training.
• Sensor-based threats in real-life settings - One
limitation of 6thSense is the adversaries (sensor-
based attacks) used in the evaluation were con-
structed in a lab environment. Note that as of this
writing, there are no real sensor-based malware in
the wild. However, recently, many independent re-
searchers have confirmed the feasibility of sensor-
based threats for smart devices [57, 17, 1, 70]. In-
deed, more recently, ICS-CERT also warned the
vendors and the wider communities about the pos-
sibility of exploiting the sensors of a device to alter
sensors’ output in a controlled way to perform ma-
licious behavior in the device [2]. Although there
are different limited security schemes to mitigate
these attacks, there is no comprehensive contextual
solution to secure smart devices from the sensor-
based threats. Furthermore, we note that even lock-
ing down the sensor API with explicit permissions
at the OS level would not surpass the sensor-based
threats as users are not aware of these threats yet
and can allow malicious Apps to use sensors un-
knowingly. For all these points, we built the prof-
of-concept versions of the sensor-based threats dis-
cussed in Section 4. We also note that to ensure
the reliability of the lab-made malware (i.e., a spe-
cific malicious App) for three threats described in
the Adversary Model Section, we checked how they
perform with respect to the real malicious software
scanners. For this, we uploaded our lab-made mal-
ware on VirusTotal and tabulated the results of the
performance of 60 different malware scanners avail-
able at the VirusTotal website in Table 8. As seen
in this table, the sensor-based threats are not recog-
nized by the different scanners. Only 2 out of 60
reported that they could detect, but these two only
reported risks without clearly identifying any ex-
plicit malicious behaviour. Hence, it is difficult to
Adversary Model Detection Ratio
Threat-1 2/60
Threat-2 2/60
Threat-3 3/62
Table 8: VirusTotal scan result for the adversary models.
detect the sensor-based threats mentioned in this pa-
per by existing security schemes. Moreover, some
security schemes only provide security to the spe-
cific sensors [57]. 6thSense covers several sen-
sors as opposed to other existing existing security
schemes without alerting the device. Also, existing
sensor management systems of Android depends on
explicit user-permission only for specific sensors
(e.g., microphone, camera, speaker). As users are
not aware of sensor-based threats yet, they can al-
low malicious Apps to use sensors unknowingly.
Additionally, 6thSense also covers no-permission-
imposed sensors (e.g., motion sensors, light sensor,
etc.) in its design.
• Context-aware Malicious App- One compelling
case is that how 6thSense can defend against a ma-
licious App which can learn and imitate a user’s be-
havior. As described earlier, Threat 3, described in
Section 4.1, can observe the working conditions of
all the sensors and detect, for instance, a sleeping
activity that records videos stealthily. 6thSense can
even detect this powerful context-aware malware
successfully. In summary, to outperform 6thSense,
a malicious App must behave like a benign App all
the time in a device, which limits its malicious pur-
poses. Any incompatible behavior in the sensors of
a smart device can be easily detected by 6thSense.
9 Conclusion
Wide utilization of sensor-rich smart devices created a
new attack surface namely sensor-based attacks. Ac-
celerometer, gyroscope, light, etc. sensors can be abused
to steal and leak sensitive information or malicious
Apps can be triggered via sensors. Security in current
smart devices lacks appropriate defense mechanisms for
such sensor-based threats. In this paper, we presented
6thSense, a novel context-aware task-oriented sensor-
based attack detector for smart devices. We articulated
problems in existing sensor management systems and
different sensor-based threats for smart devices. Then,
we presented the design of 6thSense to detect sensor-
based attacks on a sensor-rich smart device with low-
performance overhead. 6thSense utilized different ma-
chine learning (ML) techniques to distinguish malicious
activities from benign activities on a device. To the
best of our knowledge, 6thSense is the first compre-
hensive context-aware security solution against sensor-
based threats. We evaluated 6thSense on real devices
with 50 different individuals. 6thSense achieved over
95% of accuracy with different ML algorithms includ-
ing Markov Chain, Naive Bayes, and LMT . We also
evaluated 6thSense against three different sensor-based
threats, i.e., information leakage, eavesdropping, and
triggering a malware via sensors. The empirical evalu-
ation revealed that 6thSense is highly effective and ef-
ficient at detecting sensor-based attacks while yielding
minimal overhead.
Future Work: While 6thSense detects different
sensor-based threats with high accuracy, we will ex-
pand 6thSense in our future work as follows: We will
study other performance metrics such as Precision Recall
Curve (PRC). We will evaluate the efficacy of 6thSense
in other smart devices such as smartwatches and ana-
lyze all of its phases in its operations. Moreover, due
to limited resources of the smart devices, trade-off be-
tween power consumption and effectiveness is a prime
concern of any intrusion detection framework. Hence,
we will study frequency-accuracy trade-off, battery-
accuracy trade-off, and battery-frequency trade-off of
6thSense in different smart devices.
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A Theoretical Foundation
A.1 Markov Chain-Based Detection
For the Markov Chain detection model, 6thSense ob-
serves the changes of condition of a set of sensors as a
variable which changes over time. The condition of a
sensor indicates whether the sensor value is changing or
not from a previous value in time. For a specific time,
t, 6thSense considers the combination of all the sensors’
condition in the smart device as the state of our model.
As 6thSense considers change in a sensor’s condition as
binary output (1 or 0, where 1 denotes that sensor value is
changing from previous instance and 0 denotes that sen-
sor value is not changing), the number of total states of
in the detection model will be exponents of 2. For ex-
ample, if we consider the total number of sensors in set
S is 10, the number of states in our Markov Chain will
be 210 or 1024 and the states can be represented as a 10
bit binary number where each bit will represent the state
of a corresponding sensor. Assume that pi j denotes the
probability that the system in a state j at time t+1 given
that system is in state i at time t. If we have n num-
ber of sensors and m = 2n states in our model, the transi-
tion probability matrix of this Markov Chain can be con-
structed by observing the transitions from one state to
another state for a certain time. Assume that 6thSense’s
states are X0,X1, . . . ,XT at a given time t = 0,1, . . . ,T .
We can represent the transition probability matrix [83]
with Pi j =
Ni j
Ni
with Ni j = the number of transitions from
Xt to Xt+1, where Xt in state i and Xt+1 in state j; Ni =
the number of transitions from Xt to Xt+1, where Xt in
state i and Xt+1 in any other state. The initial probability
distribution of this Markov Chain can be as follows [33]:
Q =
[
q1 q2 q3 . . . . . . qm
]
(11)
where, qm is the probability that the model is in state
m at time 0. The probability of observing a sequence
of states X1,X2, . . . ,XT at a given time 1, . . . ,T can be
computed using the following equation:
P(X1,X2, . . . ,XT ) = qx1
T
∏
2
PXt−1Xt (12)
As described earlier in Section 5, for 6thSense, we use
a modified version of the general Markov Chain model.
Instead of predicting the next state, 6thSense determines
the probability of a transition occurring between two
states at a given time.
A.2 Naive Bayes Based Detection
Naive Bayes model is a simple probability estimation
method which is based on Bayes’ method. The main as-
sumption of the Naive Bayes detection is the presence of
a particular particular sensor condition in a task/activity
has no influence over the presence of any other feature
on that particular event.
Assume p(x1,x2) is the general probability distribu-
tion of two events x1,x2. Using the Bayes rule, we
can have p(x1,x2) = p(x1|x2)p(x2) where, p(x1|x2) =
Probability of event x1 given that event x2 will happen.
Now, with c, we can rewrite this formula as p(x1,x2|c) =
p(x1|x2,c)p(x2|c). If c is sufficient enough to determine
the probability of event x1, we can state that there is con-
ditional independence between x1 and x2 [54]. So, we
can rewrite the first part as p(x1|x2,c) = p(x1|c), which
then modifies the formula as follows:
p(x1,x2|c) = p(x1|c)p(x2|c) (13)
6thSense considers users’ activity as a combination of
n number of sensors. Assume X is a set which repre-
sents current conditions of n number of sensors. We con-
sider that conditions of sensors are conditionally inde-
pendent (See Section 4.2), which means a change in one
sensor’s working condition (i.e., on/off states) has no ef-
fect over a change in another sensor’s working condition.
As explained earlier, the probability of executing a task
depends on the conditions of a specific set of sensors.
So, in summary, although one sensors’ condition does
not control another sensor’s condition, overall the proba-
bility of executing a specific task depends on all the sen-
sors’ conditions. As an example, if a person is walking
with his smartphone in his hand, the motion sensors (ac-
celerometer and gyroscope) will change. However, this
change will not force the light sensor or the proximity
sensor to change its condition. Thus, sensors in a smart-
phone change their conditions independently, but execute
a task together. We can have a generalized model for this
context-aware detection [49] as follows:
p(X |c) =
n
∏
i=1
p(Xi|c) (14)
In 6thSense’s context-aware activity-oriented detec-
tion model, we have a set of training data for users’ ac-
tivities. Assume that B represents a set which denotes m
numbers of user activities. We can determine the prob-
ability of a dataset X to be classified as a user activity
using the following equation:
P(Bi|X) = P(X |Bi)P(Bi)P(X) , (15)
where i= 1,2, . . . , m. As the sum of all the conditional
probabilities for X will be 1, we can have the following
equation, which then will lead to Equation 17 [36]:
m
∑
i=1
P(Bi|X) = 1. (16)
P(Bi|X) = P(X |Bi)P(Bi)∑mi=1 P(X |Bi)P(Bi)
. (17)
This calculated conditional probability then is used to
determine the benign user activity or malicious attacks in
6thSense. In this way, 6thSense computes the probability
of occurring an activity over a certain period of time.
6thSense divides the sensor data into smaller time val-
ues (1 second) and calculates the probability of each in-
stance to infer the user activity. The calculated probabil-
ity of each second data is then used in the expected value
to calculate the total probability. As such, the probability
of the first instance is p1 with a value of a1, the proba-
bility of the second instance is p2 with a value of a2 and
so on up to the value an. Then, the expected value can be
calculated by the following formula:
E[N] =
a1 p1+a2 p2+a3 p3+ . . . . . .+an pn
a1+a2+ . . . . . .+an
. (18)
As all the values of a1, a2, ... ..., an are equally
likely, this expected value becomes a simple average of
the cumulative probability of each instance. In this way,
6thSense infers the user activity by setting up a config-
urable threshold value and checking whether the calcu-
lated value is higher than the threshold or not. If it is
lower than the threshold value, 6thSense concludes that
the malicious activity is occurring in the smart device.
